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Abstract 
 Both the common law and the law of civilian jurisdictions recognize an unborn child 
as in esse for purposes of receiving certain civil rights. In most of the cases involving prenatal 
injuries, it has been advocated that the tort law, by analogy to criminal law and property law, 
should recognize an unborn child as a person in being. The courts formerly rejected this 
argument, saying that in order to protect social and property interests a "fiction" has arisen 
that an unborn child is in being but that this "fiction" should not be invoked to protect 
personal security. The recent cases have found the protection of an unborn child's personal 
security to be equally important as the protection of social and property interests, but have 
impliedly limited the  protection to the personal interests of a viable child.  The object and 
purpose of this article is to analyze and review development of tort liability for injury to the 
unborn - from the first precedential case till the newest  era of liability for prenatal injuries, 
especially in those conditions, when Georgian Civil Legislation does not recognize this type 
of Tort Liability.  
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Introduction 
Until recent years, however, common law courts have refused to recognize a cause of 
action for a child for injuries incurred prenatally [10]. Civil law jurisdictions are somewhat at 
variance in approaching the problem. French law, like the common law, has shown 
unwillingness to recognize the rights of anunborn child in tort, the courts of Quebec and 
California have adopted a more liberal view – the Article 608 of Quebec Civil Code provides 
that persons are considered to be civilly in existence at the instant of conception if they are 
later born alive. The Articles 771 and 838, respectively provide that an unborn child may 
receive a gift inter vivos and may take a benefit under a will. The Supreme Court of Canada, 
on the basis of these articles concluded that a child en ventre sa mere is a separate being and 
applied this conclusion to actions in tort for physical injuries [7]. 
Actions for the recovery of damages resulting from prenatal injuries have arisen in 
two ways: Where a child after birth brought an action and where parents brought an action 
under the wrongful death statutes. Under the death statutes parents have no action unless a 
child could have maintained an action had he/she lived. Thus, the problem is basically the 
same in both: Can a child maintain an action to recover damages for prenatal injuries? 
Though the great weight of authority has denied a cause of action for prenatal injuries [2].  
In most of the cases involving prenatal injuries, it has been advocated that the tort 
law, by analogy to criminal law and property law, should recognize an unborn child as a 
person in being. The courts formerly rejected this argument, saying that in order to protect 
social and property interests a "fiction" has arisen that an unborn child is in being but that this 
"fiction" should not be invoked to protect personal security. The recent cases have found the 
protection of an unborn child's personal security to be equally important as the protection of 
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social and property interests, but have impliedly limited the  protection to the personal 
interests of a viable child [2].   
 
Historical Development  
The history of the development of the concept that one may be liable for injury to the 
unborn is an often-told tale [6]; it forms such an integral part of the analysis that it is 
necessarily a part of any discussion of the concept.  
The early common law recognized that the life of an unborn child was entitled to the 
legal protection of the criminal law from the time it stirred in its mother's womb. Blackstone, 
in his Commentaries  stated: “Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in 
every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in 
the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion, or otherwise, killed 
it in her womb; or if  any one beat her, whereby the child died in her body, and she is  
delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or 
manslaughter. But the modern law do not look upon this offence in quite so atrocious a light, 
but merely as a very heinous misdemeanor” [6].  
Any discussion of the history and background of the law of liability in tort for injury 
to the unborn usually begins with the case of  Dietrich v. Northampton  which appears to be 
the first reported case on this subject in a common law jurisdiction. 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Dietrich refused to extend the criminal and property 
law precedents to include a cause of action in tort. Apart from the lack of precedent, which in 
his view was a substantial reason for denying a cause of action, Justice Holmes had difficulty 
with the proposition that an infant dying before it was able to live separate from its mother 
could be said to have become a person recognized by the law as capable of having a locus 
standi in court, or being represented there by an administration [6].  
Another influential early case was the Irish decision of Walker P. Great Northern 
Railway of Ireland.  In sustaining a demurrer to a claim against a common carrier for injury 
to a child en ventre sa Me're, Chief Justice O'Brien reasoned that any duty to a child must 
flow from the contract of carriage, and, since the existence of a child was  not known to the 
carrier, no duty could exist. 
The next case to arise was Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital which was decided by the 
Illinois Supreme Court in 1900. In that case, the plaintiff's mother, her pregnancy having 
gone its full term, had entered the defendant hospital for the purpose of delivering the 
plaintiff. According to the complaint, the unborn child was seriously and permanently 
disabled by a malfunctioning elevator in the hospital. In a per curiam opinion that merely 
concurred in the views of the appellate court which in turn had relied solely on Dietrich and 
Walker, the Illinois Supreme Court denied that a cause of action existed [6]. 
The denial of a right of  recovery for prenatal injuries on the theory that "the unborn 
child was a part of the mother" may have been in accord with the state of medical  
knowledge. Standard medical works of the period recognized the separate biological 
existence of the fetus and an impressive body of medical knowledge concerning the effect of 
the prenatal environment on the unborn human fetus was accumulating.  
On the early-stage fetus can be caused by a number of phenomena, including trauma, 
other diseases, drugs and even emotional distress. Since essentially all of the vital organs take 
form at a very early stage of fetal life, the most serious postnatal disabilities result from 
injuries occurring in the first trimester of pregnancy - long before viability. From a medical 
point of view, therefore, it makes little sense to condition recovery on the viability of the 
fetus at the time of injury. The question courts have had to resolve is whether the results of 
this increased medical knowledge can be translated into a suitable formulation of duty upon 
which tort liability can  be predicated [3]. 
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Most of the early cases rested on the theory that a fetus has no existence separate from 
its mother and thus no duty toward such a "nonexistent" being could arise, it was to be 
expected that the early decisions should find a duty most clearly in those cases in which the 
fetus was viable-that is, where it had reached the stage of development where life could be 
maintained outside the mother's womb. 
In these cases, the "personhood" and separate existence of the   child were most 
clearly apparent, and courts could most readily find a duty of care. Such a duty was found by 
courts deciding both the claims of surviving infants seeking damages for disabilities resulting 
from prenatal injuries ("injury" cases) and the wrongful death actions of survivors of infants 
born alive but subsequently dying as a result of  prenatal injuries [6]. 
The legal - as opposed to the medical-infirmity of the Holmes position was pointed 
out dramatically in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, in which Justice Phillips (Supreme Court 
of Canada) stated: "If a child after birth has no right of action for pre-natal injuries, we have a 
wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy, for, although the father may be entitled to 
compensation for the loss he has incurred and the mother for what she has suffered, yet there 
is a residuum of injury for which compensation cannot be had save at the suit of the child. If a 
right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled, without any fault on its part, to go 
through life carrying the seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity 
and inconvenience without any compensation therefore. To my mind it is but natural justice 
that a child, if born alive and viable, should be allowed to maintain an action in the Courts for 
injuries wrongfully committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother." [4]. 
Just as Dietrich case had received immediate and universal acceptance, so also did 
Bonbrest v. Kotz; courts have been almost unanimous in allowing a cause of action in at least 
some circumstances. The case of  Bonbrest was one in which injuries to a viable fetus created 
a cause of action. Recent case have rejected the argument that  "legislative action” is 
necessary for recovery and have allowed recovery without express statutory authorization [8]. 
The Court have extended viability so that child is considered a person from the time of its 
conception [9].  
 
The Current Law and Maternal Liability for Prenatal Injuries  
According to the current case-law and legislation, a person is liable for injuries they 
cause to an unborn child; a fetus has legal rights the materialize when the child is born alive 
(Australia – Watt v. Ramma;  Canada  - Dobson v. Dobson; United Kingdom – the 
Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 ).   
In case R.R. v. Poland European Court of Justice replied that “the applicant (mother 
of the baby girl effected with the Turner Syndrome – caused by the negligence of medical 
professionals) experienced considerable anguish and suffering, having regard to her fears 
about the situation of her family and her apprehension as to how she would be able to cope 
with the challenge of educating another child who was likely to be affected with a lifelong 
medical condition and to ensure its welfare and happiness. Moreover, the applicant had been 
humiliated by doctors’ lack of sensibility to her plight”. The Court has found a breach of both 
Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention [11].  
Although a number of hypothetical situations can be visualized in which a child could 
suffer damage from wrongful acts of another prior to its conception, there appear to be only 
three reported appellate cases in which this issue was raised. In Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson 
Laboratories, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, applying its 
interpretation of Oklahoma law, held that an allegation that birth control pills manufactured 
by the defendant caused chromosomal changes in a mother resulting in her giving birth to 
mongoloid twins stated a cause of action for the twins for retardation, deformity, and pain 
and suffering during their lifetimes. The Illinois Supreme Court held in Renslow v. Mennonite 
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Hospital' that an allegation that the negligent transfusing of a thirteen-year-old Rh-negative 
female with Rh-positive blood resulting in permanent disability to a child born to her nine 
years later stated a cause of action on behalf of the child. In Bergstreser v. Mitchell, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, under Missouri law, a cause of action was stated 
on behalf of an infant who suffered harmful hypoxia or anoxia during an emergency 
premature Caesarian section caused by the defendant physicians' and hospital's  negligence in 
performing a prior Caesarian section on the mother [6]. 
Nowadays, one of the most important questions is whether negligent acts of a 
pregnant women causing injury to her child “en ventre sa mere“ fall within the scope of the 
well-established principles of tort law.  
The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Lynch v. Lynch replied that a mother owes 
a legally enforceable duty to care her unborn child that will be breached by negligent driving. 
The Decision of Supreme Court of Canada in Dobson v. Dobson established that while a 
fetus has certain rights against the third parties that materialize upon birth, a child cannot sue 
its mother for injuries caused prenatally by the mother’s negligence. The majority in Dobson 
asked whether a mother should be found liable for failing to obtain from the activities – 
smoking, drinking, strenuous exercise, avoiding safety checks while pregnant. The Judgment 
implies that she should not. It was contended above that tort law provides a principal limit for 
prenatal negligence and it is contended further that these particular example fall within that 
limit and therefore should be prima facie actionable [9].    
In Stallman v. Youngquist case, the United States position was that a mother was  not 
liable for injuries caused to her unborn child by her negligent driving in order to preserve the 
mothers right to privacy and bodily integrity. Conversely, in other cases a child was found to 
have a cause of action against its mother for negligently failing to cross a road at a designated 
cross-walk, or for using drug during pregnancy causing discoloration of the child’s teeth [9]. 
Thus, the case-law and legislation toward maternal liability is not uniform. 
 
“Wrongful Death” 
It is very interesting whether parents have right to bring an action for the death of 
their unborn child. Under the death statutes parents have no action unless a child could have 
maintained an action had he/she lived. In Case Cooper v. Blanck in 1923 mother in the ninth 
month of pregnancy was struck by falling plaster from the ceiling of the defendant's house. A 
premature birth followed and the child lived only a few days. The suit was under the Article 
2315 of the Civil Code which provides that parents have a right of action for the wrongful 
deaths of their children. The court of appeal of Luisiana discussed the codal articles that 
imply that a child en ventre sa mere is a living person and held that parents may sue for the 
wrongful death of a child even if the injury causing death was prenatal. Speaking of injuries 
received during the viable stages of gestation, Justice Westerfield said, “.... if the child be 
killed at this period, before its birth, we see no reason why its parents cannot maintain an 
action for the death of the child." In Youman v. McConnell' in 1927 mother in the seventh 
month of pregnancy was negligently injured; two months later the child was stillborn. The 
defense urged application of  the Article 28 which provides that children born dead are 
considered as if they had never been born or conceived. The court applied the article literally 
and refused damages for the wrongful death [1]. 
In future cases the Louisiana courts might hold that a child conceived is a separate 
being and that any injury, whether it be to an embryo or to a foetus'  would be grounds for 
recovery by the child. This position could be justified by the Article 29 of the Civil Code 
which provides that children in the mother's womb are considered, in whatever relates to 
themselves, as if they were already born [1]. 
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The courts might, as a second possibility, recognize Blackstone's theory that a child is 
a person after it has once moved in the womb of its mother-the "quick" child. The third 
possibility for Louisiana courts is the adoption of the theory propounded by Justice Boggs, 
dissenting in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, that a foetus is a separate entity after it reaches 
that stage of gestation at which it could live without its mother.  The court said: “... we 
content ourselves with the observation that the civil law is still the basis of our jurisprudence" 
[1]. Those words imply that it was adhering to the general civil law principle that an unborn 
child is considered an individual for matters which may be to its advantage. However, in 
writing for the majority, Justice Westerfield further said that the court was concerned in that 
case with a fetus advanced to the final stages of gestation when all authorities, medical and 
legal, agree that the fetus is viable.  
 
"Wrongful Life"  
The terms "wrongful life" and "wrongful birth" seem to have been used first in 
Zepeda v. Zepeda. Although courts and commentators have applied the terms to a wide 
variety of actions brought by parents or by infants for damages growing out of unexpected or 
unwanted birth, or out of birth under conditions of disability or disadvantage, it is helpful for 
purposes of analysis to break these cases down into three categories. The first American case 
in which the issue of "wrongful life" was presented to an appellate court was Zepeda. In that 
case, the infant-plaintiff sued his father for damages because he had been born an adulterine 
bastard; his father had induced his mother to have sexual intercourse by promising to marry 
her when in fact the father was already married. The damages sought were for deprivation of 
the right to be a legitimate child, have a normal home, have a legal father, inherit from his 
father and from his paternal ancestors, and for being stigmatized as a bastard. The trial court 
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action [6]. 
The second case to reach an appellate-level court was Williams v. State. That case 
presented the New York Court of Appeals with the same issue but in the different context. In 
Williams the defendant was the State of New York whose alleged negligent supervision of a 
state mental institution allowed a female patient, the plaintiffs mother, to be raped by another 
patient, resulting in the plaintiffs birth to a mentally defective mother. The New York Court 
of Appeals, like the Appellate Court of Illinois, held that the common law did not recognize 
as actionable the act of causing one to bear the "shame and sorrow" of illegitimate birth. New 
York Court of Appeals in Williams v. State replied "Being born under one set of 
circumstances rather than another  or to one pair of parents rather than another is not a suable 
wrong that is cognizable in court." [6].  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, we tried to overview the development of tort Liability for injury to the 
unborn. The law concerning tort liability for injuries to the unborn has evolved in several 
distinct but sometimes overlapping phases since the first case was posed for the American 
judiciary by Dietrich in 1884. In the first era there was uniformity of decision that recovery 
was not allowed for prenatal injuries. That phase came to an abrupt end in 1946 with the 
Bonbrest decision. The phase immediately following Bonbrest was one in which injuries to a 
viable fetus created a cause of action. The next phase, which is not marked by any clear 
initial boundary and continues to the present, is the era in which a cause of action is 
recognized for injuries received by the fetus prior to viability. The newest phase in the 
developing law of the unborn is introduced by actions seeking recovery for maternal 
negligence, wrongful life or wrongful birth. 
 However, despite the rapid development of tort Liability for injury to the Unborn, the 
best end of justice cannot be served until the courts and the legislatures have fully recognized 
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that an individual has a value simply for his status as a human being. The Courts and 
legislators should reconsider the legal status  of  the unborn fetus and the measure of damages 
in death actions or health injuries.  
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